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Abstract
We develop a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of two locations within a city where
heterogeneous households make joint location and tenure mode decisions. To investigate the
effect of homeownership on equilibrium prices and allocations, we compare the response of
this model economy to a labor shock with that of a rental-only version. This comparison
yields three results. First, homeownership enables more households to remain in the more
desirable location at the expense of newcomers. Second, homeownership adds to the volatility
of the housing market. Third, homeownership may amplify the dispersion of household
income within a location. Homeownership raises distributional issues. The households who
consume the most housing gain the most from the ability to own their home. Newcomers to
the city are the main losers.
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University of Munich are gratefully acknowledged.This paper studies how homeownership aﬀects local housing markets and the distri-
bution of households across residential properties. Housing diﬀers from other durable
consumption goods insofar as a housing purchase is typically tied to the purchase of
land, a durable which does not depreciate. This makes housing a desirable asset to hold
in one’s portfolio as a hedge against shocks to the local economy. The novelty of the
present paper is to embed key features of existing models of household tenure choice
into an equilibrium framework where heterogeneous households choose both housing
consumption and tenure.
This framework enables us to analyze formally the type of issues raised in the fol-
lowing concrete example. Let us consider the case of taxicab drivers in central London
who do not expect their income to grow as fast as local housing costs. If they want to
live in central London and remain there for years, they have a strong incentive to buy
their home. Buying a home allows them to set their monthly housing expenditures to
a known level, independent of future rent ﬂuctuations. If the London economy booms,
attracting new economic activity and new workers, the resulting pressure on the hous-
ing market will force housing costs upward. Since the taxicab drivers own their home,
they enjoy capital gains. The increase in the opportunity cost of their home may lead
some to move out of central London, but not as many as if they had been renting.
This low mobility of local homeowners adds upward pressure on the housing market.
Faced with higher central London housing rents and prices, the new workers moving
into central London are fewer and richer. This helps explain the high levels of income
heterogeneity we observe within neighborhoods — neighborhoods where, for example,
taxicab drivers live next to newly arrived investment bankers.
The example captures the main insights gathered from our model as far as the
eﬀects of homeownership are concerned. Without homeownership, more households
move out of the prime location given one and the same price rise. As a consequence,
the cost of housing in the prime location does not rise as much in response to a positive
shock. The lower rise in housing cost incites a broader cross-section of new workers to
move into the prime location, hence less income disparity between the newcomers and
the native households who do not move.
Homeownership raises ﬁrst and foremost distributional issues. Although the incom-
ing teachers may have the higher level of human capital, they ﬁnd themselves living
in worse accommodation than the taxicab drivers who beneﬁted from getting on the
1property ladder ahead of the boom. The taxicab drivers enjoy capital gains; they win.
The newcomers face higher housing costs; they lose. With homeownership, the wealth
of a household who owns its home depends on its past fortunes on the housing market,
and so does its housing consumption. Without homeownership, the distribution of
homes across households is closer to the distribution of human capital.
Our results on income dispersion provide a new explanation for a long-standing
puzzle in the literature concerning the distribution of households across communities:
standard models predict too much stratiﬁcation of households according to income
into overly homogeneous communities.1 This is particularly the case for static models
concerned with mobility among local jurisdictions. These models assume a single di-
mension of household heterogeneity.2 B´ enabou (1993) showed that stratiﬁcation also
arises in a dynamic model with local complementarities in human capital investment
and endogenously determined local land rents.3 To obtain some degree of income
heterogeneity within communities, Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999)
extend the local jurisdiction model by assuming that households diﬀer not only in terms
of income, but also in terms of preferences. Here we propose an alternative explanation
for imperfect stratiﬁcation based on the fact that the wealth distribution may diﬀer
from the income distribution owing to the heterogeneity of households’ housing market
experiences.
The key feature of the housing market we focus on is the inability of households to
vary their exposure to housing returns independently of their consumption of housing
services. This is a problem of market incompleteness. Recent research has explored
the signiﬁcance of the resulting insurance motive for homeownership at the household
level and reports evidence that diﬀerences between the ﬁnancial risks of renting and of
owning are signiﬁcant drivers of housing tenure choices.4 A discussion of this literature
is provided in Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2002).
We obtain our results without introducing a further dimension of market incom-
pleteness relevant to the housing market: credit constraints. There is ample empirical
1E.g., Epple and Platt (1998), Ioannides (2001), Ioannides and Seslen (2001).
2See Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 1993) and Goodspeed (1989) for examples of such models
with a housing market.
3Along the same line of research, Durlauf (1996) proposes a model of communitywide inﬂuences
on individual attainment where income requirements proxy for zoning restrictions.
4E.g., Davidoﬀ (2001), Hilber (2002), Sinai and Souleles (2001).
2evidence that credit constraints may override other concerns in the tenure decision for
a subset of households.5 While we acknowledge the determinant role credit constraints
play in the tenure decision of a subset of households, we focus here on the equilibrium
interaction of households suﬃciently wealthy that credit constraints are not likely to
aﬀect their tenure choice.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. In Section 2,
we consider the decision problem of an individual household. Section 3 determines
the equilibrium allocation and prices. Section 4 compares this equilibrium with its
counterpart in a rental-only version of the model. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding
remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
1 The Model
We consider a two-period model of a city with two locations, 1 and 0. Initially, the city
is populated by a measure one of households. These native households are distributed
uniformly over the unit interval, each being identiﬁed by an index i 2 [0;1]. Over its
lifetime, household i receives a stream of endowments of the numeraire good whose
capitalized value in period 2 is W(i), an increasing continuous function of i.
At the start of each period, a native household may either buy or rent a single home
for own use in one of the two locations. The household derives additively separable
utility from the consumption of housing and the numeraire good. Housing is enjoyed at
the end of periods 1 and 2, the numeraire good only at the end of period 2. There is no
discounting of housing utility across periods. For concreteness, we assume that location
1 is more desirable than location 0: housing utility derived from a home in location 0
is normalized to zero, whereas a home in location 1 yields an additive utility premium
of ¹ > 0 per period, independent of tenure. The non-housing utility derived from
consumption of c units of the numeraire good is described by the constant absolute
risk aversion function U(c) = ¡e¡ac where a > 0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion.
5E.g., Linneman and Wachter (1989), Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (1999), Chiuri and Jappelli (forth-
coming).
6Haavio and Kauppi (2002) argue that credit constraints in the housing market reduce labor
mobility.
3Native households face uncertainty about the cost of housing in the second period
because the city is potentially subject to a population shock at the start of period
2. With probability ¼ strictly between 0 and 1, a measure º of newcomer households
arrives (state H); with the complementary probability, no shock occurs (state L). Like
native households, newcomers are distributed uniformly over the unit interval; they are
characterized by the index n 2 [0;1]. Their endowment is deﬁned by the increasing and
continuous function ˜ W(n). They have the same utility function as natives adjusted
for the fact that they cannot obtain any utility from housing in period 1. The only
decision they face is whether to live in location 1 or 0 in the second period and how
much of the numeraire good to consume.
The supply of housing in location 0 is perfectly elastic at a price normalized to
zero. The supply of housing in location 1 is perfectly inelastic: at the start of period
1, absentee landlords own a measure S of homes there. For reasons that will become
clear later, we assume that 0 < º < S < 1
2 throughout the paper.7
The landlords are risk neutral and do not derive any consumption beneﬁt from
owning properties. Their sole investment alternative is a savings technology available
to all. All agents can save or borrow between periods 1 and 2 at the exogenously given
interest rate r.
As period 2 is the last period of the economy, renting a home in period 2 is equivalent
to buying it, so the price of a home in period 2 coincides with the rental cost of that
home in period 2. Moreover, arbitrage on the part of the landlords ensures that the
price of a home in period 1 equals the ﬁrst-period rent plus discounted expected second-
period rent. For a home in location 1, this means that the ﬁrst-period price is




where R1 denotes the ﬁrst-period rent and ¯ R2 = ¼ RH + (1 ¡ ¼)RL the expected
second-period rent.
For a home in location 0, the normalization of rents to zero implies that the ﬁrst-
period price is zero as well by the analogue of equation (1). This means in particular
7For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume extreme diﬀerences in the
supply of housing between the two locations. The key feature here is that the supply of housing in 1
is less elastic than in 0. The assumptions on º and S are for ease of exposition.
4that it makes no diﬀerence for a household wishing to live in location 0 in the ﬁrst
period whether it rents or buys its home.
Equation (1) highlights what ownership means in this model: by purchasing a home
in the ﬁrst period, a household eﬀectively signs a two-period rental contract, locking in
the second-period rent at its expected level. If the household plans to stay in location
1 in the second period, purchasing the home in the ﬁrst period provides insurance
against rent ﬂuctuations. Whether buying in location 1 instead of renting is more or
less risky therefore depends on the household’s planned housing consumption in the
second period. If the household plans to stay in location 1 in the second period, buying
provides insurance against rent ﬂuctuations. If it plans to sell and move to location 0,
buying provides exposure to potential capital gains or losses.
With two periods, the model therefore captures the empirically supported hypoth-
esis that at short horizons, households’ concerns over period-to-period rent risk are
dominated by concerns over end-of-holding-period price risk, and vice versa at long
horizons.8
2 Native Households’ Behavior
Taking the three rent levels R1, RH, RL and the price p1 as given, a native household
must choose a location and a tenure mode for period 1, and a location plus the level of
numeraire consumption for each possible state of the world in period 2. The household’s
housing consumption plan or location plan is denoted by the triple (h1;hH;hL), where
h1, hH and hL take the value of 1 for location 1, and 0 otherwise. To indicate the tenure
choice in case h1 = 1, we denote the combined location-tenure plan by (1B;hH;hL) if
the household buys a home, and (1R;hH;hL) if it rents one. Figure 1 summarizes the
choices available to a native household.
The household has to choose among eight location plans as there are two alternatives
for each of period 1, period 2 state H, and period 2 state L. In addition, for the four
location plans that involve living in location 1 in period 1, the household must decide
whether to buy or rent. That is a total of twelve location-tenure plans.
8See Sinai and Souleles (2001).
5Period 1 Period 2
Housing
(Buy in 1) 1B
(Rent in 1) 1R
(Live in 0) 0
(Live in 1) 1
(Live in 0) 0
Numeraire cH
(Live in 1) 1















Figure 1: Household choices
2.1 Tenure Choice
Ex post, given that the economy is in state s 2 fH;Lg, given the corresponding rental
price Rs, and given the household’s housing and tenure choice, the budget constraint







if it lived in location 0 in the ﬁrst period,
U
³
W ¡ (1 + r)R1 ¡ hsRs
´
+ (1 + hs)¹ (3)
if it rented a home in location 1 in the ﬁrst period, and
U
³
W ¡ (1 + r)p1 + (1 ¡ hs)Rs
´
+ (1 + hs)¹
= U
³
W ¡ (1 + r)R1 ¡ ¯ R2 + (1 ¡ hs)Rs
´
+ (1 + hs)¹ (4)
if it bought a home in location 1 in the ﬁrst period. Under this last scenario, the
household pays period 1 plus expected period 2 rent and gets back the realized period
2 rent if it moves out of location 1 after the ﬁrst period.
6These equations highlight what is at issue with regards to the tenure choice: the
stochastic properties of numeraire consumption. For a given housing location choice,
the utility derived from housing consumption is independent of tenure choice, by as-
sumption. What the tenure determines is how shocks to housing costs translate into
ﬂuctuations in non-housing consumption.9
Equation (1) implies that expected non-housing consumption is independent of
tenure choice, as can easily be seen from computing the expectation of the consumption
levels ﬁguring in (3) and (4), respectively. So the tenure choice reduces to choosing
the option that induces the smallest absolute diﬀerence between the non-housing con-
sumption levels in the two states of the economy.
In our analysis of tenure choice, we will assume that RL < RH. We will see later that
this inequality must hold in any equilibrium where some newcomers choose location 1
in state H.
As the tenure mode in location 0 is of no consequence, we only need to consider
the four housing consumption plans that involve living in location 1 in the ﬁrst period:
(1;1;1), (1;1;0), (1;0;1), and (1;0;0). It turns out that the household prefers to
own if its housing consumption plan is (1;1;1) or (1;1;0), and prefers to rent if its
plan is (1;0;1) or (1;0;0). The crucial diﬀerence for tenure is therefore whether or
not the household plans to move out of the more desirable home in case the cost of
occupying such a home turns out to be high. This is fairly obvious for the location
plans with a deterministic horizon in the type 1 home, (1;1;1) and (1;0;0), since in
these cases one of the tenure modes provides full insurance whereas the other does not.
Thus, ownership dominates rental for a household who has a deterministic two-period
horizon in location 1, while the opposite holds true for a household with a deterministic
one-period horizon in location 1.
Under the plans (1;1;0) and (1;0;1), by contrast, either tenure mode imposes
some risk on the household. Under (1;1;0), the household’s non-housing consumption
is necessarily higher in state L. If it rents in the ﬁrst period, non-housing consumption
9In the present framework, ﬂuctuations in non-housing consumption are entirely driven by shocks
to housing costs in location 1. If the household’ earnings were stochastic, the tenure choice would
depend on the extent to which rents and income co-vary, not just on the stochastic properties of
the housing rent alone. Furthermore, if housing costs in location 0 were stochastic, the covariance
between housing costs in the two locations would matter for tenure choice. These eﬀects are analyzed
in Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2002).
7in state L is higher by RH since the second-period rent is paid precisely when it is
high. If the household buys the home in the ﬁrst period, on the other hand, non-
housing consumption in state L is higher by RL since the household’s non-housing
consumption is boosted by the revenue from the sale of the home precisely when this
revenue is low. Under (1;1;0), buying is thus less risky. Under (1;0;1), this logic is
reversed. The household’s non-housing consumption is now necessarily higher in state
H. If it rents in the ﬁrst period, non-housing consumption in state H is higher by RL
since the second-period rent is paid when it is low. If the household buys the home in
the ﬁrst period, on the other hand, non-housing consumption in state H is higher by
RH since the household’s non-housing consumption is boosted by the revenue from the
sale of the home when this revenue is high. So buying is more risky under (1;0;1).10
We summarize these ﬁndings in
Lemma 1 If RL < RH, a native household wanting to live in location 1 in the ﬁrst
period prefers to own its home if and only if it plans to stay in location 1 should state
H occur in the second period.
2.2 Choice of Location
Each possible location-tenure plan determines a curve in the plane with co-ordinates W
(the household endowment) and EU (the expected overall utility level). For any given
W, the optimal plan is the one which yields the highest expected utility. Determining
the optimal plan for every W amounts to characterizing the upper envelope of these
expected utility curves.
First, the CARA speciﬁcation of non-housing utility implies that the expected util-
ity of any housing consumption and tenure plan can be written as EU = ¡Ae¡aW +B
with plan-speciﬁc constants A > 0 and B ¸ 0. As a consequence, if the expected
utility curves of two plans cross, the curve associated with the plan that promises a
10Note that these results on tenure choice rely merely on risk aversion, and not on the CARA
speciﬁcation of utility. For a treatment of tenure choice with arbitrary risk averse utility of numeraire
consumption, see Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2002). In the present paper, the CARA speciﬁcation
is adopted to make the household’s choice of housing consumption plan and the computation of
equilibrium tractable.
8larger amount of housing consumption in location 1 ex ante (and so has the higher B)
is steeper at all endowment levels.11 This immediately yields
Lemma 2 The amount of housing a native household expects to consume in location
1 is weakly increasing in the household’s endowment.
Second, using CARA utility, it is easy to verify that the preference ranking of the
plans (1R;0;0) and (0;1;1) does not depend on the household’s endowment W. In
other words, the expected utility curves associated with these two plans are either
identical or do not intersect.
Lemma 3 The plan (1R;0;0) weakly dominates (0;1;1) if and only if
e
a(1+r)R1 · ¼e
aRH + (1 ¡ ¼)e
aRL; (5)
with a strict preference if the inequality is strict.
Third, to make further progress in the characterization of native households’ optimal
housing consumption, we turn to the case where RL < RH. Under this condition, we
obtain the following restriction on the set of location-tenure plans that may underlie
the upper envelope of expected utility curves.
Lemma 4 If RL < RH, a native household chooses a location-tenure plan from the
following subset of alternatives: (0;0;0), (0;0;1), (0;1;1), (1R;0;0), (1R;0;1) and
(1B;1;1).
Given Lemma 1, Lemma 4 shows that two further plans are irrelevant to the house-
hold when RL < RH: the plans (0;1;0) and (1B;1;0). Increasing the wealth of a
household who chooses (0;0;0) will prompt this household to eventually consume some
housing in location 1. The cheapest location 1 housing available is in period 2 state L.
This is the one the household will choose ﬁrst as its wealth rises. Conversely, decreasing
the wealth of a household who chooses (0;1;1) will prompt this household to eventu-
ally relinquish some housing in location 1. As location 1 housing is more expensive in
11The amount of housing consumption in location 1 can be 0, ¼, 1 ¡ ¼, 1, 1 + ¼, 2 ¡ ¼ or 2.
9state H than in state L, this is the one the household will give up ﬁrst as its wealth
decreases. This is why no household ever chooses (0;1;0). The same argument applies
to (1B;1;0).
Fourth, continuing to assume RL < RH, we show that there exist endowment levels
at which native households choose (0;0;1) or (1R;0;1) and so make their housing
consumption in period 2 contingent on the state that occurs.
Lemma 5 Let RL < RH. Then,
(i) at least one of the plans (0;0;1) and (1R;0;1) is preferred to both (0;0;0) and
(1B;1;1) at all endowment levels in some set of positive measure;
(ii) at least one of the plans (0;0;1) and (1R;0;0) is preferred to both (0;0;0) and
(1R;0;1) at all endowment levels in some set of positive measure;
(iii) the plan (0;0;1) is preferred to both (0;1;1) and (0;0;0) at all endowment levels
in some set of positive measure;
(iv) the plan (1R;0;1) is preferred to both (1B;1;1) and (1R;0;0) at all endowment
levels in some set of positive measure.
This lemma is a consequence of the assumption that marginal utility of non-housing
consumption decreases continuously in wealth. Together with our previous results on
household behavior, it will prove useful when we characterize equilibrium prices and
allocations, to which we now turn.
3 Equilibrium
We need to solve for the market-clearing rental costs R1, RH and RL of housing in
location 1 for period 1, period 2 state H and period 2 state L, respectively. The supply
of housing in location 1 is S. Aggregate demand in period 1 and each state of period
2 is computed by adding up the relevant measures of households living in location 1.
10To formulate the main result of this section, we need the following deﬁnition. Let
e > 1 be the unique real number satisfying the equality



























Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium. If
¹e
a ˜ W(1) > e ¡ 1; (7)
a positive measure of newcomers choose location 1 in state H, the equilibrium prices
satisfy RL < (1 + r)R1 < RH and condition (5), and the location-tenure plans chosen
by a positive measure of native households are (0;0;0), (0;0;1), (1R;0;0) plus either
² (0;1;1), or
² (0;1;1) and (1R;0;1), or
² (0;1;1), (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;1), or
² (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;1).
If (7) does not hold, all newcomers choose location 0 in state H and the equilibrium
prices satisfy (1+r)R1 = RL = RH = (lne)=a, so tenure does not matter. The location
plans chosen by a positive measure of native households are (0;0;0), (0;1;1), (1;0;0),
plus possibly (1;1;1).
Obviously, our interest lies in equilibria where some newcomers choose location 1
in state H, so that there is uncertainty about second-period housing costs. Inequality
(7) provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition on the primitives of the model for this
to be the case. This condition is straightforward to derive once one has shown that an
equilibrium without any newcomers in location 1 must have RH = (lne)=a. In fact,
(7) simply says that the richest among the newcomers do want to live in location 1 at
this price.
In an equilibrium where some newcomers choose location 1 in state H, the inequality
RL < RH reﬂects the price pressure they exert. That the opportunity cost of choosing
location 1 in the ﬁrst period, (1 + r)R1, lies strictly in between RL and RH is then
dictated by market clearing. Intuitively, the cost of living in location 1 in period 1
11cannot be too diﬀerent from the cost of living in location 1 in period 2 for sure, a cost
which lies in between RL and RH.
In the remainder of this section, we sketch the main steps in the proof of Proposition
1. The detailed proof is in the appendix.
In the previous section, we derived properties of household behavior under the
condition RL < RH. In the ﬁrst step of the proof, we add analogs to Lemmas 4 and 5
under the conditions RL > RH and RL = RH, respectively. This fuller description of
household behavior enables us to establish that in equilibrium, RL < RH if and only if
a positive measure of newcomers choose location 1, and RL = RH otherwise.
In the second step, we characterize the set of possible equilibrium conﬁgurations,
where by conﬁguration we mean the set of plans that are each chosen by a positive
measure of native households. This step relies on properties of household behavior plus
market clearing. We proceed by ﬁrst proving that all equilibrium conﬁgurations contain
the plan (0;0;0) under our assumption that S < 1
2.12 Then, in the case RL < RH,
our assumption that º < S implies that a positive measure of native households must
choose location 1 in state H and so one of the plans (1B;1;1) and (0;1;1). Lemma 5
together with market clearing then implies the following statements: (1) if (1B;1;1) is
chosen, then all plans listed in Lemma 4 must be part of the conﬁguration, possibly with
the exception of (0;1;1); (2) if (0;1;1) is chosen, then the plans (0;0;1) and (1R;0;0)
must be part of the conﬁguration. For the case RL = RH, a simpler argument applies.
The third step of the proof consists in characterizing the households who choose the
plans that make up the equilibrium conﬁguration. By Lemma 2, this problem reduces
to identifying the households who are at the margin between any two “adjacent” plans
in the conﬁguration. In preparation, we use the market clearing conditions to show
that the measure of households who choose (1R;0;0) is at least as large as the measure
of households who choose (0;1;1). By Lemma 3, this means that condition (5) holds,
and with equality if (0;1;1) is chosen by a positive measure of households. We therefore
do not need to consider the plan (0;1;1) when we compute the indices of the marginal
households.
12Relaxing this assumption would add conﬁgurations without (0;0;0). This would lengthen the
analysis without adding any insights.
12Four critical endowment indices fully characterize native households’ choices. For







































































Given our results on the set of possible equilibrium conﬁgurations, these critical indices
satisfy the following conditions in equilibrium: 0 < i1 · i2 < i3 · i4.
Newcomers face a deterministic one-period problem since they only enter if state
H occurs. Given the continuity and monotonicity of the endowment function ˜ W, we
obtain a critical index n1 such that the newcomers with index n > n1 prefer location
1 over location 0. This index is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
¹e












Figure 2 illustrates the household choices and the distribution of properties we
may obtain in equilibrium. On the right of the axes the ﬁgure shows the housing
consumption plan of the households whose index lies between the critical indices marked
on the left of the axes. From the deﬁnition of the ﬁve critical indices, it is now trivial
to compute the demand for housing in location 1 period 1, period 2 state H and period
2 state L. Note that our use of min and max operators in the deﬁnitions of the critical
indices allows us to write each demand for location 1 housing as a single expression for
all possible equilibrium conﬁgurations. We obtain the following set of market clearing
conditions
S = 1 ¡ i3 + ½(i3 ¡ i2); (13)
S = 1 ¡ i4 + (1 ¡ ½)(i3 ¡ i2) + (1 ¡ n1)º; (14)



















Figure 2: Possible equilibrium housing choices
where ½ is the fraction of households with indices between i2 and i3 who choose









This system of four equations for the three rents and ½ can be transformed into the
following system of three equations for the three rents plus one equation for ½:
2(1 ¡ S) = i1 + i3; (17)
2(1 ¡ S) + º = i2 + i4 + ºn1; (18)
e










i3 ¡ (1 ¡ S)
i3 ¡ i2
: (20)
14The fourth step of the proof uses this system to establish existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium and to prove that (1 + r)R1 lies between RL and RH. Equations (17)
and (19) determine R1 and RL as monotonic functions of RH. Equation (18) then
determines a unique RH.
4 Comparison with a Rental-Only Economy
We wish to contrast the results of the previous section with the equilibrium in an econ-
omy where households are not given the opportunity of owning their accommodation.
So all homes have to be rented from the absentee landlords at the relevant rental price
R1, RH or RL.
Replicating the arguments we used in the economy with homeownership, we can
verify that in a rental-only equilibrium where some newcomers choose location 1 in
state H, the rental prices satisfy RL < RH and native households will choose housing
consumption plans from the following subset of alternatives: (0;0;0), (0;0;1), (0;1;1),
(1R;0;0), (1R;0;1) and (1R;1;1). Again, (0;1;1) is weakly dominated by (1R;0;0) and
can arise as a native household’s equilibrium choice only if (5) holds as an equality.
So there are again four critical indices that characterize marginal households. The
indices i1, i2, i3 are deﬁned exactly as in the previous section. For indiﬀerence between









Proposition 1 carries over literally to the rental-only case once the plan (1B;1;1)
is replaced by (1R;1;1). Moreover, the necessary and suﬃcient condition (7) for some
newcomers to choose location 1 in state H is the same in both economies. This is
because tenure does not matter when all newcomers choose location 0, so the distinction
between the two economies becomes moot in this case. On the other hand, removing
the plan (1B;1;1) from the menu of available options only matters when some native
households choose this plan in the equilibrium of the previous section. We obtain the
following result.13
13We use superscripts “r” and “o” when we need to distinguish variables in the rental-only economy
from their counterparts in the ownership economy.
15Proposition 2 There is a unique equilibrium in the rental-only economy. If a positive
measure of newcomers choose location 1 in state H and a positive measure of native
households choose the plan (1B;1;1) in the economy where homeownership is allowed,















To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the overall utility a native
household gets from the plans (1B;1;1), (1R;1;1) and (1R;0;1) after optimizing its non-
housing consumption. Figure 3 plots these utilities against the household’s endowment
index, assuming the prices of the ownership equilibrium. The critical index i4 is located
where the utility curves for the housing consumption plans (1B;1;1) and (1R;0;1)
intersect. As discussed in Section 2, (1R;1;1) is dominated by (1B;1;1), so the utility












Figure 3: Comparison of the ownership and the rental-only equilibria
16Holding prices at the ownership-equilibrium level, eliminating ownership does not
aﬀect a household’s utility except in the case that it plans to stay in location 1 what-
ever the shock. In that case, it now has to choose (1R;1;1) instead of (1B;1;1). Since
(1R;1;1) is dominated by (1B;1;1), the household who used to be at the margin be-
tween (1B;1;1) and (1R;0;1) now prefers (1R;0;1). At the prices of the ownership
equilibrium, therefore, eliminating ownership causes a shift in location-tenure plans
from (1B;1;1) to (1R;1;1) and (1R;0;1). On Figure 3, the index i4 moves to the right,
to i0
4.
The resulting drop in demand for location 1 in state H implies that the price in
state H must be lower in the rental economy. A lower RH encourages both more natives
and more newcomers to choose location 1 in state H. Holding R1 and RL constant,
a lower RH increases the utility provided by the plan (1R;1;1). On Figure 3, this
would be represented by an upward shift of the corresponding curve and a decrease in
i4. The proof of Proposition 2 establishes that this second eﬀect on i4 only partially
compensates the increase due to the unavailability of ownership.
The lower RH may prompt some households who choose the plan (1R;0;0) in the
ownership economy to choose (0;1;1) in the rental economy. If this happens, then the
rents R1 and RL cannot be identical in the two economies. Given the lower demand
in period 1 and the higher demand in state L that would result from the switch in
consumption plans, R1 must be lower and RL must be higher in the rental economy.
If no household chooses (0;1;1) in the rental economy, then the same is true in the
ownership economy.14 In this case, the eﬀect on demands in period 1 and period 2 state
L does not come into play, and the rents R1 and RL are the same in both economies.
This explains the weak inequalities for R1 and RL in the proposition.
As Proposition 2 shows, allowing households to own their home aﬀects both price
dynamics and the response of the distribution of households across locations. First,
allowing households to own their home increases the volatility of housing prices as
measured by their second-period variance. This is an immediate consequence of the
fact that the diﬀerence RH ¡ RL is strictly larger in the case where households are
allowed to own their homes.
14This result is easy to derive from the proof of Lemma A.13 in the appendix.
17Second, allowing households to own their home increases the number of native
households that choose to remain in location 1 in state H, and reduces the number
of newcomer households moving in. Given how the equilibrium rental prices in the
two economies compare, the newcomers’ critical index n1 is higher in the ownership
economy while the natives’ critical index i2 is at least as high as in the rental-only
economy. By market clearing, in particular equation (18), this implies that the native
households’ critical index i4 is smaller in the ownership economy.
Third, allowing households to own their home increases the diﬀerence between the
average income of the newcomers who move to location 1 and the average income of
the natives who stay in location 1 in period 2 when state H occurs. In fact, as i4
is lower and n1 is higher in the economy with homeownership, some poorer native
households stay put in location 1 in state H when ownership is an option, while the
income distribution of the newcomers who choose location 1 is truncated at a higher
level. Unless the average income of newcomers located in 1 is lower than the average
income of their native neighbors, this diﬀerence in averages implies greater income
dispersion under homeownership than in the rental-only economy.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Allowing households to own their home increases the variance of second-
period housing prices, reduces the number of newcomer households moving to location
1 when state H occurs, and increases the diﬀerence in average income between the
newcomers and the natives who live in location 1 in state H.
Who gains from ownership, who looses? If only RH diﬀers between the ownership
and the rental economy, the only households aﬀected are the ones who live in location
1 in both periods. These households beneﬁt from ownership because it enables them
to insure their second-period housing expenditures. The same eﬀect remains if all
rents diﬀer between the ownership and the rental economy but the changes in R1 and
RL now aﬀect the welfare of all households who consume some housing in location 1.
Those who choose (0;0;1) in both economies face a lower rent RL in the ownership
economy and so are better oﬀ. This implies that some households who would not
consume any location 1 housing in the rental economy would in case of a downturn
in the ownership economy. Households who choose (1R;0;0) face a higher rent in the
18ownership economy and so are worse oﬀ; the same must be true for any household who
chooses (0;1;1). The relative diﬀerences of R1 and RL between the two economies are
such that the households who choose (1R;0;1) in both economies are also worse oﬀ
under ownership.15
Overall, the main beneﬁciaries from ownership are the richest households, who take
advantage of the insurance beneﬁt of owning their home and live in location 1 for both
periods. Households who choose the next lower level of housing consumption, those
who move out of location 1 in case of a boom, are at best as well oﬀ in the ownership
economy as in the rental economy. This is why fewer households choose to move out of
location 1 in response to a boom in the ownership economy, hence our results on the
contribution of homeownership to housing market dynamics.
5 Concluding Remarks
By providing insurance against rent increases, homeownership decreases household mo-
bility, which in turn ampliﬁes the volatility of housing prices and may lead to greater
income dispersion within neighborhoods. These results are robust to introducing in-
come uncertainty in addition to the labor shock we model. Households who do not
expect their income to follow housing costs, yet want to remain in the desirable loca-
tion, have the strongest incentive to own. In the economy with homeownership, more
of them choose to stay put, so the insights gathered above remain.
Whether or not households are allowed to own their home raises primarily distribu-
tional issues. Homeownership does not generate any ineﬃciencies in our model of the
housing market. It still remains that homeownership may amplify existing ineﬃcien-
cies in the broader economy. This would be the case if eﬃciency in the labor market
required a spatial allocation of workers driven by human capital. Given the determi-
nant role of household wealth for the allocation of workers over space via the housing
market, by disconnecting the wealth distribution from the human capital distribution,
homeownership may generate or amplify labor market ineﬃciencies.
15This result is easy to derive from the proof of Lemma A.14 in the appendix.
19The model focuses on the housing market incompleteness which stems from the
bundling of housing consumption and investment into the same durable good. The
longer a household plans to remain in its home, the stronger its incentive to own as
insurance against period-to-period rent risk. Any further incentive to own would only
amplify the eﬀects of homeownership. For example, a preference for homeownership,
moral hazard in the rental market, or mortgage interest deductions would encourage
more households to own their home and to stay put in the face of a local boom.
Several proposals have been put forward to eliminate the housing market incom-
pleteness we focused on here; e.g., Case, Shiller and Weiss (1993) and Caplin et al.
(1997). Housing price index derivatives and home equity insurance have recently come
to life and more products are being planned. The empirical literature arguing in favor
of such instruments implicitly assumes that they would not aﬀect housing returns. The
insights of the present paper suggest, however, that allowing households to disconnect
their housing consumption from their housing investment will aﬀect housing market
dynamics. This will be the focus of future research.
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22Appendix
A.1 Proofs
To ease the notational burden, we deﬁne
e1 = ea(1+)R1; eH = eaRH; eL = eaRL; e2 = ea ¯ R2: (A.1)
Proof of Lemma 4: In view of Lemma 1, it is enough to show that the plans (1B;1;0) and (0;1;0)
are never optimal. We deal with (1B;1;0) ﬁrst.
Suppose ¼ > 1
2. Let W1 be the endowment level at which a native household would be indiﬀerent
between the plans (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;1), and W2 the endowment level at which it would be indiﬀerent
between the plans (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;0). To show that the plan (1B;1;0) is never optimal, it suﬃces
to show that W1 < W2. To see this, recall from Section 2 that if the expected utility curves of two plans
cross, the curve associated with the plan that promises a larger amount of housing consumption in
location 1 ex ante is steeper at all endowment levels. The curve associated with (1B;1;1) is above the
curve associated with (1R;0;1) to the right of W1, and the curve associated with (1R;0;1) is above the
curve associated with (1B;1;0) to the left of W2. If W1 < W2, this implies that the curve associated
with (1B;1;0) is everywhere below the upper envelope of the curves associated with (1R;0;1) and
(1B;1;1).
















¡ ¼ (e2 ¡ 1)
¸
: (A.3)
It is easy to show that W1 < W2 if and only if e2 > eL, which in turn is equivalent to RL < RH.
Now suppose ¼ < 1
2. Let W3 be the endowment level at which a native household would be
indiﬀerent between the plans (1R;0;1) and (1R;0;0):
¹eaW3 = e1 (eL ¡ 1): (A.4)
The plan (1B;1;0) is never optimal if W2 < W3. This inequality is easily seen to be equivalent to
e2 > eL.
In the case where ¼ = 1
2, a comparison of expected utilities shows that for e2 > eL, the plan
(1R;0;1) is preferred to (1B;1;0) at all endowment levels. This completes the proof that (1B;1;0) is
never optimal.
Turning to (0;1;0), suppose ¼ > 1
2. Let W4 be the endowment level at which a native household
would be indiﬀerent between the plans (0;1;0) and (0;1;1), and W5 the endowment level at which it
would be indiﬀerent between the plans (0;0;1) and (0;1;0):




(eL ¡ 1) ¡
¼
1 ¡ 2¼
(eH ¡ 1): (A.6)
The plan (0;1;0) is never optimal if W4 < W5. It is easy to verify that this inequality is equivalent to
eL < eH.
Next suppose ¼ < 1
2. Let W6 be the endowment level at which a native household would be
indiﬀerent between the plans (0;0;0) and (0;0;1), and W7 the endowment level at which it would be
indiﬀerent between the plans (0;0;0) and (0;1;0):
¹eaW6 = eL ¡ 1; (A.7)
¹eaW7 = eH ¡ 1: (A.8)
23The plan (0;1;0) is never optimal if W6 < W7, which is obviously the same as eL < eH.
In the case where ¼ = 1
2, a comparison of expected utilities shows that for eL < eH, the plan
(0;0;1) is preferred to (0;1;0) at all endowment levels. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5: Part (i): Let W1 be the endowment level at which a native household would be
indiﬀerent between the plans (0;0;0) and (1R;0;1), and W2 the endowment level at which it would
be indiﬀerent between the plans (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;1). To show that the plan (1R;0;1) is preferred
to both (0;0;0) and (1B;1;1) on a set of endowment levels of positive measure, it is enough to show
that W1 < W2. To see this, recall from Section 2 that if the expected utility curves of two plans cross,
the curve associated with the plan that promises a larger amount of housing consumption in location
1 ex ante is steeper at all endowment levels. The curve associated with (1R;0;1) is above the curve
associated with (0;0;0) to the right of W1, and above the curve associated with (1B;1;1) to the left
of W2. If W1 < W2, therefore, (1R;0;1) is preferred to both (0;0;0) and (1B;1;1) at all wealth levels









[e2 ¡ ¼ ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)eL]: (A.10)
It is easy to see that W1 < W2 if and only of 2(1¡¼)e1(e2 ¡eL)+¼ [e1e2 ¡2e1 +1] > 0. As eL < eH,
we have e2 > eL. If e2 ¸ e1, we also have e1e2¡2e1+1 ¸ (e1¡1)2, so e2 ¸ e1 is a suﬃcient condition
for W1 < W2, and hence for (1R;0;1) to be preferred to (0;0;0) and (1B;1;1) on some open interval
of endowment levels.
Next, let W3 be the endowment level at which a native household would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (0;0;0) and (0;0;1), and W4 the endowment level at which it would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (0;0;0) and (1B;1;1):




[e1e2 ¡ ¼ ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)eL]: (A.12)
It is easy to see that W3 < W4 if and only of e1e2 ¡ 2e2 + 1 + 2(e2 ¡ eL) > 0. As eL < eH, we have
e2 > eL. If e1 ¸ e2, we also have e1e2 ¡ 2e2 + 1 ¸ (e2 ¡ 1)2, so e1 ¸ e2 is a suﬃcient condition for
W3 < W4, and hence for (0;0;1) to be preferred to (0;0;0) and (1B;1;1) on some open interval of
endowment levels.
Part (ii): An argument similar to the one used for part (i) shows ﬁrst that for e1 · eL, (1R;0;0)
is preferred to (0;0;0) and (1R;0;1) on some open interval of endowment levels; and second, that for
e1 ¸ eL, (0;0;1) is preferred to (0;0;0) and (1R;0;1) on some open interval of endowment levels.
Part (iii): Let W5 be the endowment level at which a native household would be indiﬀerent
between the plans (0;0;0) and (0;1;1), and W6 the endowment level at which it would be indiﬀerent
between the plans (0;0;1) and (0;1;1):
¹eaW5 = ¼eH + (1 ¡ ¼)eL ¡ 1; (A.13)
¹eaW6 = eH ¡ 1: (A.14)
It suﬃces to show that W5 < W6. This is easily seen to be equivalent to eL < eH.
Part (iv): Let W7 be the endowment level at which a native household would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (1R;0;0) and (1B;1;1), and W8 the endowment level at which it would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;1):
¹eaW7 = e1 (e2 ¡ 1); (A.15)
¹eaW8 = e1
·






24It suﬃces to show that W7 < W8. This is easily seen to be equivalent to eL < e2, which in turn is the
same as eL < eH.
Proof of Proposition 1: Lemma A.6 shows that in equilibrium, second period rents satisfy
RL < RH if a positive measure of newcomers choose location 1, and RL = RH otherwise. Lemma
A.11 shows that (5) holds if RL < RH. Lemmas A.8 and A.9 show that equilibrium conﬁgurations
must be as stated in the proposition. This implies that the relevant market clearing conditions are
(13)–(16). Lemma A.12 shows that these conditions are equivalent to the system of equations (17)–
(20). Lemmas A.13 and A.14 show that this system admits a unique solution with RL · RH and the
properties stated in the proposition. Lemma A.15 shows that this solution yields an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are shown along exactly the
same lines as in the proof of Proposition 1. Note in particular that equations (17) and (19) are the
same in both economies, so Lemma A.13 with its description of e1 and eL as continuous monotonic
functions of eH carries over without any modiﬁcation. Given a value for eH, we thus have the same
values for e1, eL, i2 and n1 in both economies. In contrast, we have io
4 < ir
4 at any given value of
eH that is assumed common to both economies, diﬀerent from eL and such that 0 < io
4 < 1. By the
deﬁnitions of these indices, the stated inequality is equivalent to e2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)eL < ¼eH, which always
holds by the convexity of the exponential function. As a function of eH, therefore, the right-hand side
of (18) is strictly larger in the rental-only economy over the range where 0 < io
4 < 1. This implies that
if io
4 < 1 in the ownership equilibrium, then the equilibrium rental prices in state H satisfy eL < eH.
The remaining comparison results now follow from Lemma A.13.
A.2 Auxiliary Results on Household Behavior
If RL > RH, the roles of the two states in period 2 are reversed. The following three results are
therefore just mirror images of Lemmas 1, 4 and 5, respectively, and do not require proofs of their
own.
Lemma A.1 If RL > RH, a native household wanting to live in location 1 in the ﬁrst period prefers
to own its home if and only if it plans to stay in location 1 should state L occur in the second period.
Lemma A.2 If RL > RH, a native household chooses a location-tenure plan from the following subset
of available options: (0;0;0), (0;1;0), (0;1;1), (1R;0;0), (1R;1;0) and (1B;1;1).
Lemma A.3 Let RL > RH. Then:
(i) at least one of the plans (0;1;0) and (1R;1;0) is preferred to both (0;0;0) and (1B;1;1) at all
endowment levels in some set of positive measure;
(ii) at least one of the plans (0;1;0) and (1R;0;0) is preferred to both (0;0;0) and (1R;1;0) at all
endowment levels in some set of positive measure;
(iii) the plan (0;1;0) is preferred to both (0;1;1) and (0;0;0) at all endowment levels in some set of
positive measure;
(iv) the plan (1R;1;0) is preferred to both (1B;1;1) and (1R;0;0) at all endowment levels in some
set of positive measure.
If RH = RL, the tenure mode is irrelevant, so native households’ decisions concern location only.
Lemma A.4 If RL = RH, each of the location plans (1;1;0), (1;0;1), (0;1;0) and (0;0;1) is optimal
for a native household at precisely one endowment level, and suboptimal at all other endowment levels.
Thus, only the plans (0;0;0), (0;1;1), (1;0;0) and (1;1;1) may be chosen by a positive measure of
native households.
25Proof: The ﬁrst statement follows if we let RL tend to RH in Lemmas 4 and A.2. The second
statement follows trivially from the ﬁrst.
Lemma A.5 Let RL = RH. If the location plans (1;1;1) and (0;0;0) are optimal at some endowment
levels, then one of the plans (1;0;0) and (0;1;1) is preferred to both (1;1;1) and (0;0;0) on a set of
endowment levels of positive measure.
Proof: As RL = RH, we have eL = eH = e2, for which we shall write e¤.
Let W1 be the endowment level at which a native household would be indiﬀerent between the
plans (0;0;0) and (1;0;0), and W2 the endowment level at which it would be indiﬀerent between the
plans (1;0;0) and (1;1;1):
¹eaW1 = e1 ¡ 1; (A.17)
¹eaW2 = e1 (e¤ ¡ 1): (A.18)
Thus, W1 < W2 if and only if e1 (e¤ ¡ e1) + (e1 ¡ 1)2 > 0, a suﬃcient condition for which is e¤ ¸ e1.
Next, let W3 be the endowment level at which a native household would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (0;0;0) and (0;1;1), and W4 the endowment level at which it would be indiﬀerent between
the plans (0;1;1) and (1B;1;1):
¹eaW3 = e¤ ¡ 1; (A.19)
¹eaW4 = e¤ (e1 ¡ e¤): (A.20)
Thus, W3 < W4 if and only if e¤ (e1 ¡ e¤) + (e¤ ¡ 1)2 > 0, a suﬃcient condition for which is e1 ¸ e¤.
This implies that no matter what e1 and e¤ are, at least one of the inequalities W1 < W2 and W3 < W4
holds.
A.3 Results on Equilibrium Prices and Conﬁgurations
In the following, we shall write D1, DH and DL for native households’ aggregate demand for housing
in location 1 in period 1, period 2 state H, and period 2 state L, respectively.
Lemma A.6 In equilibrium, second period rents satisfy RL < RH if a positive measure of newcomers
choose location 1, and RL = RH otherwise.
Proof: Suppose that RL ¸ RH with a positive measure of newcomers choosing location 1 in state
H. Then, Lemmas A.2 and A.4 imply that DL · DH. Aggregate demand for housing in location 1
by native households and newcomers is therefore higher in state H than in state L. Given that the
supply of housing in location 1 is the same in both states, this is incompatible with market clearing.
This proves the ﬁrst part of the lemma.
Next, suppose that RL < RH with all newcomers choosing location 0 in state H. Then, market
clearing implies DH = DL, which in turn implies that the plans (1R;0;1) and (0;0;1) are not chosen
by any native households. This contradicts parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5 unless either (1R;0;0) and
(0;1;1) are the only plans chosen (in which case they are chosen in equal measure), or (1B;1;1) and
(0;0;0) are the only plans chosen. The ﬁrst alternative contradicts our assumption that S < 1
2, the
second contradicts part (i) of Lemma 5. A similar argument involving Lemma A.3 instead of Lemma
5 shows that the inequality RL > RH is incompatible with no newcomers choosing location 1 in state
H. This proves the second part of the lemma.
Lemma A.7 In any equilibrium, the plan (0;0;0) is chosen by a positive measure of native house-
holds.
26Proof: From Lemma A.6, we know that RL · RH. From Lemmas 4 and A.4, we know that the
only housing consumption plans that may be chosen by a positive measure of native households are
(1;1;1), (1;0;1), (1;0;0), (0;1;1), (0;0;1) and (0;0;0). We write m111 for the measure of native
households choosing (1;1;1), m101 for the measure of native households choosing (1;0;1) etc.
Now suppose m000 = 0. Then, market clearing in period 1 implies m001 + m011 = 1 ¡ S; market
clearing in period 2 state L implies m100 = 1¡S. Adding up these two equations yields m001+m011+
m100 = 2(1 ¡ S) > 1, which contradicts the fact that the total native population has size 1.
Lemma A.8 In an equilibrium where a positive measure of newcomers choose location 1 in state
H, the location-tenure plans chosen by a positive measure of native households are (0;0;0), (0;0;1),
(1R;0;0) plus either
(a) (0;1;1), or
(b) (0;1;1) and (1R;0;1), or
(c) (0;1;1), (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;1), or
(d) (1R;0;1) and (1B;1;1).
Proof: From Lemma A.6, we know that RL < RH. From Lemma 4, we know that the only plans that
may be chosen by a positive measure of native households are (1B;1;1), (1R;0;1), (0;1;1), (1R;0;0),
(0;0;1) and (0;0;0). Because of our assumption that º < S, there must be a positive measure of
native households consuming housing in location 1 in state H. This means that at least one of the
plans (1B;1;1) and (0;1;1) must be chosen.16
Case 1: (0;1;1) is not chosen, so (1B;1;1) must be chosen. We want to show that (1R;0;1),
(1R;0;0) and (0;0;1) are chosen as well. Market clearing requires D1 = DL > DH, so (1R;0;1) must
be chosen, or both (1R;0;0) and (0;0;1) must be chosen. By part (iv) of Lemma 5, (1R;0;1) is chosen
whenever (1R;0;0) is chosen. So (1R;0;1) must be chosen. Next, Lemma A.7 implies that (0;0;0) is
chosen, so by part (ii) of Lemma 5, at least one of (0;0;1) and (1R;0;0) is chosen. As D1 = DL, one
cannot be chosen without the other.
Case 2: (1B;1;1) is not chosen, so (0;1;1) must be chosen. First, note that (1R;0;0) must be
chosen as well; otherwise, D1 cannot equal DL. Next, Lemma A.7 implies that (0;0;0) is chosen, so
by part (iii) of Lemma 5, (0;0;1) is chosen.
Case 3: Both (1B;1;1) and (0;1;1) are chosen. Arguing as in the previous case, we see that
(1R;0;0) (0;0;1) and (0;0;0) are chosen as well. Finally, part (iv) of Lemma 5 implies that (1R;0;1)
is also chosen.
Lemma A.9 In an equilibrium where all newcomers choose location 0 in state H, the location plans
chosen by a positive measure of native households are (0;0;0), (0;1;1), (1;0;0) plus possibly (1;1;1).
Proof: From Lemma A.6, we know that RL = RH. For this case, Lemma A.4 implies that the only
housing consumption plans possibly chosen by a positive measure of native households in equilibrium
are (0;0;0), (0;1;1), (1;0;0) and (1;1;1). Lemma A.7 implies that (0;0;0) is chosen. Lemma A.5
implies that the conﬁguration cannot just consist of (0;0;0) and (1;1;1). Market clearing implies that
if the equilibrium conﬁguration contains (0;1;1), it must also contain (1;0;0), and vice versa.
By Lemma 3, this immediately implies
Lemma A.10 In an equilibrium where all newcomers choose location 0 in state H, equation (5) holds
with equality; as RL = RH, this means (1 + r)R1 = RL = RH.
16Here and in what follows, we always understand the word “chosen” to mean “chosen by a positive
measure of native households”.
27Lemma A.11 In an equilibrium where a positive measure of newcomers choose location 1 in state H,
the measure of native households who choose the plan (1R;0;0) is at least as large as the measure of
native households who choose the plan (0;1;1). As a consequence, (0;1;1) cannot dominate (1R;0;0),
so (5) holds.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that fewer native households choose (1R;0;0) than (0;1;1). In view
of Lemmas A.6 and 4, this implies that DH ¸ DL, which is incompatible with the premise that a
positive measure of newcomers choose location 1 in state H.
A.4 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
It will be convenient to work with e1, eL and eH instead of R1, RL and RH, respectively. We deﬁne
Ã = ¹eaW(1¡S) + 1.
Lemma A.12 The system of equations (13)–(16) is equivalent to the system of equations (17)–(20).
Proof: Adding up equations (13) and (14), we obtain (18). Adding up equations (13) and (15), we
obtain (17). Now, if e1 < ¼eH + (1 ¡ ¼)eL then ½ = 1. Equation (13) then implies i2 = 1 ¡ S, which
by the deﬁnition of i2 yields
e1 = ¼Ã + (1 ¡ ¼)eL < ¼eH + (1 ¡ ¼)eL: (A.21)
Then, since i2 = 1 ¡ S, equation (20) simply becomes ½ = 1. If e1 = ¼eH + (1 ¡ ¼)eL then ½ · 1
and the deﬁnition of i2 becomes ¹eaW(i2) = eH ¡ 1. Moreover, (13) implies i2 · 1 ¡ S, hence
¹eaW(1¡S) ¸ eH ¡ 1. Therefore,
e1 = ¼eH + (1 ¡ ¼)eL · ¼Ã + (1 ¡ ¼)eL: (A.22)
Therefore equation (19) holds. Using (13), we obtain (20).
Conversely, equation (19) gives us two possible cases. First, if ¹eaW(1¡S)+1 < eH, then (19) plus
the deﬁnition of i2 imply i2 = 1 ¡ S, which yields ½ = 1 by equation (20) and implies that equations
(13) and (16) hold. Then, replacing one term 1 ¡ S by i2 in equations (18) and (17) yields equations
(14) and (15) for the case ½ = 1. Second, if Ã · eH, then (19) implies that (16) holds. Using (20) to
replace one 1 ¡ S term in equations (18) and (17) yields equations (14) and (15). Rearranging (20)
yields (13).
For our next result, recall the deﬁnition of e in Section 3. It is straightforward to see that e < Ã.
Lemma A.13 Equations (17) and (19) yield e1 and eL as continuous monotonic functions of eH,
with the ﬁrst weakly increasing and the second weakly decreasing in eH. The inequality eL < eH holds
if and only if eH > e. More precisely, ¹eaW(1¡2S) + 1 < eL < e < e1 < eH if e < eH < Ã, and
¹eaW(1¡2S) + 1 < eL < e1 < Ã · eH if eH ¸ Ã. Finally, eL = e1 = eH if and only if eH = e.
Proof: Equation (17) implies that neither i1 nor i3 can be zero, and at most of them can assume
the value one. By the deﬁnitions of i1 and i3, the right-hand side of (17) is strictly increasing in eL,
and weakly increasing in e1. This deﬁnes eL as a weakly decreasing function of e1 which assumes the
value Ã at e1 = 1 and tends to ¹eaW(1¡2S) + 1 as e1 goes to inﬁnity. Rearranging equation (19) into
(1 ¡ ¼)eL = e1 ¡ ¼ minfeH; Ãg (A.23)
deﬁnes eL as a strictly increasing function of e1, given eH. This function assumes a value of at most 1
at e1 = 1 and tends to inﬁnity as e1 does. This implies that for any given eH, (17) and (19) determine
unique values of e1 and eL with ¹eaW(1¡2S) + 1 < eL < Ã. An increase in eH either leaves both
28functions unchanged, or shifts the second function down and leaves the ﬁrst unchanged. Continuity
is obvious.
Next, note that in the (e1;eL)-plane, the graph of the function deﬁned by (A.23) cuts the 45
degree line from below at e1 = minfeH; Ãg, while the graph of the function deﬁned by (17) cuts the
45 degree line from above at e1 = e. Using these facts, it is now easy to verify the statements about
the ranking of e1, eH and eL.
Lemma A.14 The system of equations (17)–(19) has a unique solution with eH ¸ e, and eH = e if
and only if ¹ea ˜ W(1) · e ¡ 1.
Proof: We want to to establish that equation (18) admits a unique solution eH once e1 and eL are
solved for as functions of eH according to Lemma A.13. First, we note that i2 is weakly increasing in
e1 and weakly decreasing in eL. This implies that i2 is weakly increasing in eH. Second, n1 is also










where z = [(eH=eL)¼ ¡ 1]=¼ is strictly increasing in eH and non-negative when eH ¸ e. We know
from the proof of Lemma A.13 that i3 > 0. If i3 < 1, then ¹eaW(i3) = e1eL ¡ e1, which is weakly
increasing in eH by Lemma A.13 and equation (17) because i1 is weakly decreasing in eH. This in
turn implies that e1eL ¡e1 is weakly increasing in eH. Given that e1 is weakly increasing in eH, e1eL
is weakly increasing. So, if i3 < 1, then i4 is weakly increasing in eH, and strictly increasing up to
the level 1. If i3 = 1, it is immediate that i4 = 1 as well. This establishes that the right-hand side of
(18) is strictly increasing in eH up to a point and then possibly constant. The term i4 +ºn1 becomes
constant when eH is so high that i4 = n1 = 1. In addition, when eH ¸ Ã, then equation (19) and
the deﬁnition of i2 implies that i2 = 1 ¡ S. So, if the right-hand side of (18) ever becomes ﬂat as
eH increases, it does so at the level 2 ¡ S + º which is greater than the left-hand side of (18). At
eH = e, we have i2 = i1 and i4 = i3, so (17) implies that the right-hand side of (18) does not exceed
the left-hand side. This establishes existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of equations
(17)–(19) with eH ¸ e. It also shows that eH = e if and only if n1 equals 1 at eH = e, that is, if and
only if ¹ea ˜ W(1) · e ¡ 1.
Lemma A.15 The solution to the system of equations (17)–(19) identiﬁed in Lemma A.14 constitutes
an equilibrium.
Proof: If ¹ea ˜ W(1) · e¡1, we have e1 = eL = eH = e by Lemma A.13 and so 0 < i1 = i2 < i3 = i4.
If ¹ea ˜ W(1) > e ¡ 1, Lemma A.13 implies that 0 < i1 < i2 < i3 · i4. This shows that the ranking of
the critical endowment indices i1 through i4 is the one that we assumed when formulating the market
clearing conditions (13)–(16). So, the solution we identiﬁed constitutes an equilibrium.
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